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Introduction 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) marked its 10
th anniversary at the 
beginning of 2004. Sugar and High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) are a pair of key 
commodities that been affected by a freer trade environment among member economies. 
Of the three routes of trade flow, U.S.– Mexico, U.S.-Canada and Mexico- Canada, both 
sugar and HFCS trade between the U.S. and Mexico has been drawing the most attention 
because of the magnitude of economic and political impacts on these economies. When 
trading sugar with the United States, the Mexican sugar industry faces two counteracting 
conditions under the NAFTA regime: increased access to the U.S. market which would 
facilitate increased sugar exports at favorable prices; and the pressure of increased 
imports of HFCS from the United States which has been gaining an increasing share of 
Mexico’s sweetener market since 1994. Under the provisions of NAFTA, both an over-
quota tariff for Mexican sugar which enters into the United States and a tariff on exported 
HFCS which enters the Mexican market are regulated in such a way that both tariffs will 
be reduced to zero by 2008 and 2004, respectively. In addition to the rules of the tariffs, 
Mexican sugar is subject to U.S. import quota allocations. Mexico is allowed to access 
two kinds of quotas, depending on Mexico’s domestic balance in the sweetener market: if 
Mexico’s sugar production exceeds its sweetener consumption (the sum of sugar and 
HFCS consumption in two consecutive years -“net surplus sweetener producer status”), 
Mexico receives 25,000 MT of sugar import quota; and if not, Mexico receives 7,258 MT 
of quota. Additionally beginning in 2000, the sugar import quota expands from 25,000 
MT to 250,000 MT. In 2008 when all the restrictions are lifted, Mexico will have free 
and unlimited access to the U.S. sugar market.   3
  In Mexico, the sugar industry has played an important role in the economy and 
the politics of the country. In spite of experiencing drastic economic and political changes 
including NAFTA, devaluation, privatization of the sugar cane processing industry in the 
1990s, and several changes in the policy regime, sugar production has shown steady 
expansion over the past 10 years: Mexican sugar production expanded from 3.2 million 
MT in 1990 to 4.7 million MT in 2000 (COAAZUCAR, 2003a). A significant amount of 
surplus sugar destined to export has been generated since 1995, ranging from 200,000 
MT in 1995 to over 1.1 million MT in 1998 (COAAZUCAR, 2003a). These records may 
appear favorable; however, Mexico stood to benefit little from NAFTA. From 1996 
through 1999 Mexico successfully received a 25,000 MT import quota as a result of 
attaining a net surplus producer status, yet it did not enjoy the expanded quota (250,000 
MT) from 2000 through 2002 (USDA, 2003a) because Mexico’s production fell short 
relative to its sweetener consumption. This indicates that Mexico missed the opportunity 
to export sugar under-quota even though it generated a significant surplus. Combined 
with a slump in production that occurred in 1999 and 2000, the Mexican sugar industry 
underwent an economic crisis. In September 2001, the Mexican government expropriated 
27 of 60 Mexico’s functioning sugar mills in order to maintain the industry (USDA, 
2002b). The circumstances surrounding the sugar industry remain unfavorable, 
consequently there has been little benefit to the Mexican sugar industry resulting from 
NAFTA.  
The U.S. sugar market, where a large quantity of sugar is traded by a large 
number of sellers, has maintained commodity balance by assigning import quotas to 
foreign sellers. As a result of GATT, the United states committed to accept a minimum   4
import quota of 1.256 million MT of sugar in 1990. In the meantime, HFCS had been 
gaining its share in the U.S. sweetener market since the early 1970s when commercial 
production of HFCS became possible by the advancement of wet-milling technology. 
Today, more than 50 percent of caloric sweetener consumption in the United States is 
derived from corn syrup including HFCS (Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, 1999). A similar phenomenon appears to be beginning in Mexico. The 
implementation of NAFTA resulted in open the door for HFCS consumption in Mexico 
where nearly all of the caloric sweetener consumption was derived from domestically-
produced sugar before 1994. Reflecting this threatening trend of replacing domestic sugar 
consumption with HFCS, in 1996 the Mexican government imposed tariffs on HFCS 
claiming that the U.S. companies were dumping HFCS at an unfair price and affecting 
the export volume and value of Mexican sugar. This action evolved into a trade dispute 
between the United States and Mexico and ended when the WTO panel ruled against 
Mexico’s claim (Garcia et al., 2002 and 2004). Overall, NAFTA has not brought about 
significant changes in the U.S. sugar market because the Mexican exporters have been 
unable to significantly expand shipments to the United States. Rather, attention was 
poured into issues with HFCS which posed an immediate impact on Mexican sweetener 
market.  
Looking ahead in the sweetener markets in both the United States and Mexico, 
several questions remain unanswered. How much sugar surplus Mexico will generate; 
how much sugar will cross the border both under- and over-quota; what will happen after 
2008 when all the restrictions are eliminated on Mexican sugar; what is the impact of 
Mexico’s HFCS adoption in both sweetener markets; and what are the political   5
implications on U.S. sugar program as a consequence of the above? In this study, the 
direction of the U.S.-Mexico sugar trade was examined through quantitative methods, 
paying close attention to HFCS. A bilateral trade model between the U.S. and Mexico 
using mathematical programming provides insights for the market balance in the future 
including political implications. 
Empirical Models 
The empirical procedures consist of two components: demand and supply analysis 
models for both the U.S. and Mexican sugar markets; and a bilateral sugar trade analysis 
model, which was built upon the results from the former.  
First, demand and supply elasticities for sugar were estimated by regression using 
time-series data. Both demand and supply equations were specified in double-log form 
with a price variable and other associated shifters used as explanatory variables. Serial 
correlation was anticipated and corrected by the Yule-Walker Method with appropriate 
lags assigned. Neither demand nor supply for HFCS was estimated in either country due 
to limited availability of HFCS price data.  
Second, a U.S.–Mexico bilateral sugar trade model was built based on a spatial 
equilibrium model developed by Takayama and Judge (1964). This model provides the 
optimal equilibrium price and quantity through maximization of welfare in each country, 
i.e. the sum of the consumer and producer surplus, given the demand and supply 
equations and the transportation cost between two regions. Linear inverse demand and 
supply equations (price endogenous) were formulated using estimated elasticities from 
the previous analysis and built in the objective function (Spreen et al., 2000). Transfer 
costs such as transportation cost and tariffs are considered as loss in welfare and were   6
also incorporated in the objective function. Necessary conditions, i.e. demand-incoming 
shipment and supply-outgoing shipment balance as well as ones specific to the bilateral 
trade model such as Mexico’s quota allocation under NAFTA and U.S. price support 
were assigned as constraints. The model was solved by using the mathematical 
programming software package GAMS.  
In order to run simulations on the bilateral model, several assumptions were made. 
The quantities in the model are raw sugar equivalent. In doing so, the price difference 
along the vertical market channel was ignored. Changes in sugar stocks in both countries 
were also ignored and hence the excess sugar supply from Mexico and the excess sugar 
demand from the United States were captured as the differences between sugar demand 
and supply in each country. Although HFCS demand and supply were not directly 
estimated, a shift in sugar demand at industry level caused by a change in HFCS demand 
in Mexico was simulated through HFCS adoption forecast. The model was calibrated 
with the actual values realized in 2001 (base year) and iterated for solutions from 2002 
through 2015. Slopes for both inverse demand and inverse supply curves were held 
constant, yet these curves were designed to shift over the forecast horizon according to 
the scenarios proposed in the study.  
Verification of the bilateral sugar trade model 
The model is verified by checking the first-order conditions obtained through using 
Kuhn-Tucker theorem. The objective function of the U.S.–Mexico bilateral sugar trade 
model and associated constraints are defined as: 
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where US, MX, ROW represent Mexico, the U.S. and the rest of the world, respectively;  
Q
D and Q
S  are quantity demanded and supplied, respectively; Xi,j and XXi,j are quantity 
shipped from i to j under-quota and over-quota, respectively; t is a time period from 2002 
to 2015; Tij is a per unit transportation cost from i to j; OQTarMX, US, ,t is a per unit over-
quota tariff imposed on Mexican sugar shipped to the United States in year t according to 
the tariff schedule under NAFTA provisions; PROW is a world price of raw sugar; Quota t 
is the quota allocated to Mexico in year t under NAFTA provisions; and USMin t is the 
quota allocated to the rest of the world in year t (the U.S. minimum sugar import   8
requirement less the quota allocated to Mexico). Note that the transportation cost within a 
country is assumed to be zero. The transfer cost of sugar from the rest of the world to the 
United States includes the price of sugar; i.e. sugar shipped from the rest of the world and 
Mexico compete with each other to enter the U.S. market. The last term in the objective 
function considers Mexico’s sales of sugar to the rest of the world. Constraints define the 
balances between the incoming shipment and the quantities demanded as well as 
outgoing shipment with the quantities supplied; and quotas imposed on Mexican sugar 
and from the rest of the world. 
Lagrangian form (L) of the maximization problem is given as: 
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where V, W, λ and σ are Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with each constraint 
representing the imputed marginal value of price of sugar demanded, supplied, that of 
Mexican sugar exported under-quota and that of over-quota, respectively. Note that λ is 
positive in sign and σ is negative, reflecting the way these associated constraints are 
defined. By omitting the time notation t, Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a typical time 
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By solving equations above, the following conditions must hold at the equilibrium 
a): 
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  Complementary slackness conditions indicate that if Mexico exports sugar to the 
U.S. under-quota (X MX, US > 0), then the demand price in the United States should not 
exceed the value of exporting Mexican sugar, which is equivalent to the sum of the 
supply price, transportation cost and the marginal value of exporting sugar under-quota 
(equation [22]). By the same token, if Mexico exports sugar to the U.S. over-quota (XX 
MX, US > 0), then the demand price in the United States should not exceed the sum of the 
Mexican supply price, transportation cost, tariff imposed on over-quota sugar and the 
marginal value of exporting sugar under-quota (equation [24]). The inequality of the 
prices expressed in equation [26] accords with reality. If both over-quota export from   11
Mexico (XX MX, US) and export from the rest of the world (X MX, US) are greater than zero, 
the following must also hold from equations [24] and [25].  
  P
S
 MX - PROW  = TROW, US  - TMX, US   - OQTarMX, US       (27) 
This equation implies that when the price difference between Mexico and the rest of the 
world is equal to the difference in transfer cost (transportation cost and tariff), both the 
over-quota export from Mexico and the export from the rest of the world occur at the 
same time. In other words, Mexico would export over-quota only if the transportation 
cost from the rest of the world is high enough to justify Mexico to do so. Based on this 
relationship, the model was further calibrated by adjusting the average transportation cost 
from the rest of the world to the United States to adequately reflect the Mexican sugar 
supply and export capacity: the transportation cost is calibrated so that Mexico exports 
sugar over-quota at the minimum amount. This calibration procedure resulted in a rather 
high transportation cost from the rest of the world to the United States; however, it 
insinuates the irrational behavior of the Mexican sugar industry which has been suffering 
from financial stress, vividly illustrated by the mill expropriation by the government in 
2001, and producing and exporting surplus sugar to the rest of the world at the same time. 
Scenarios to simulate   
Scenarios were formulated by considering alternative assumptions related to HFCS 
consumption, continued gains in the productivity of the Mexican sugar industry and the 
U.S. policy levers. In this paper, five scenarios are proposed and summarized in Table 1. 
Scenario 1 represents the situation where status quo is maintained; Scenario 2 considers 
faster improvement in Mexican production; and Scenario 3 assumes Mexico will adopt 
HFCS at high rate in addition to production improvement. These three scenarios assume 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a) Assuming non-zero production and consumption in both the Unites States and Mexico.   12
that the U.S. government allocates sugar quota in a flexible manner between Mexico and 
the rest of the world. By contrast, Scenario 4 considers the situation where the U.S. 
government maintains minimum quotas (the remaining of the minimum import 
requirement less allocated to Mexico) to the rest of the world no matter how much 
Mexico exports to the United states. Scenario 5 considers the situation where the U.S. 
government buys up the excess sugar in the market instead of maintaining the existing 
price support. Scenario 4 and 5 are the scenarios that consider the different quota 
allocation or alternative Sugar program, respectively. 
  Pay-offs from each scenario were calculated for three industries (the U.S. HFCS 
industry, the U. S. sugar industry and the Mexican sugar industry) and two countries (the 
U.S. and Mexico). Pay-offs to the industries were expressed as present values of 
accumulated revenue between 2002 and 2015, assuming a three percent discount rate 
each year. HFCS price was held constant at the average U.S. export price to Mexico 
realized between 1992 and 2001. Pay-offs to the countries were expressed as present 
values of accumulated welfare, i.e. the sum of consumer and producer surplus. The U.S. 
welfare was adjusted with the tariff revenue from Mexico, the cost of the sugar program 
and the cost of buying up excess sugar. The cost of the sugar program was calculated 
using the loan rate for raw sugar (18 cents per pound). The cost of buying up the excess 
sugar was calculated using the U.S. net sugar import, i.e. total sugar import less 
1,256,000 MT of minimum import requirement. Note that since the values were 
converted in terms of U.S. dollars prior to simulations, the exchange rate realized in the 
base year (2001) was implicitly used for calculating pay-offs.    13
Data 
Data for the Mexican sugar industry was obtained from the website of Comité de la 
Agroindustria Azucarera (COAAZUCAR, Sugar Agro-Industry Committee). The 
committee is in charge of monitoring sugar cane and sugar production at each mill as 
well as determining cane price paid to farmers in the country. The latter task was taken 
over from the former government body after the privatization of the industry. The 
committee carries extensive data set regarding not only physical production and price but 
also detailed productivity and efficiency indicators such as sugar and fiber contents in 
cane, mill down- time and sugar production loss during the process across operating 60 
mills. Data for the U.S. sugar industry was obtained from the Sugar and Sweetener 
Situation and Outlook Yearbook and some other publications by the Economic Research 
Service, USDA. Historic data for population were obtained form the website of the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census; and those for GDP, exchange rates and consumer price index were 
taken from OECD documents. 
Results 
Demand and supply analysis  
The results for the U.S. demand and supply analysis are summarized in Table 2. In the 
demand analysis, signs of estimates associated with each significant variable was as 
expected. Significant estimates at 95 percent confidence level were associated with price, 
the dummy variables for quarter 1 and 3, and the dummy variable for HFCS availability. 
The estimated price elasticity of demand was inelastic. The significant estimate 
associated with HFCS dummy variable implies that HFCS replaces sugar as a substitute 
in the market. In the supply analysis, estimates associated with trend and production in 
the previous year (autoregressive term) were significant at 95 percent confidence level for   14
all three (total, beet and cane sugar) supply regression models. Estimates associated with 
sugar recovery rate were insignificant in all models. Estimates associated with price and 
cost were significant at 95 confidence level for total and beet sugar supply regressions, 
but not for the cane sugar supply equation. Two possible reasons why cane sugar 
production does not respond to the refined sugar price but beet sugar production does are: 
(1) cane sugar requires two steps in the refinery process while beet sugar has one and (2) 
sugarcane is perennial crop while beet is an annual. The results imply that sugar beet 
production is more sensitive to price changes. Although cane sugar production is 
assumed to respond to raw sugar price, the coefficient of the price variable is not 
significant. Estimated price elasticities were both inelastic for total sugar and beet sugar 
as anticipated.  
The results for the Mexico demand and supply analysis are summarized in Table 3. 
In the demand analysis, signs of significant estimates associated with each variable were 
consistent with a priori expectations. The only statistically significant estimate among the 
three price elasticities was direct consumption, and it was inelastic. Population variables 
accounted for most of the explanatory power of consumption in all models. The 
significant estimate associated with GDP in indirect sugar and total sweetener 
consumption indicates that consumers tend to consume more sugar through sugar-
contained products as their incomes increase. In the supply analysis, the signs of 
estimates associated with each variable corresponded with a priori expectations. The 
estimate associated with price was inelastic. While reduction in production cost and 
factory down-time indicate an increase in production, the length of sugarcane harvest 
duration was almost parallel to sugar production. The insignificant estimate associated   15
with sugar loss during the process implies that the degree of sugar loss is not as critical as 
other factors such as production cost and factory down-time for the mills to improve their 
production efficiency. The positive and significant estimate associated with trend 
indicates technology related to sugar production at sugar mills had been advancing during 
the years covered by the observed period.      
U.S. -Mexico bilateral sugar trade analysis 
U.S. sugar import forecasts for the selected four scenarios are illustrated in Figure 1 
through 4. The results from baseline scenario (Scenario 1) shows that if status quo 
surrounding sugar industries in both countries is maintained over the forecast horizon, 
Mexico will not likely attain a net surplus sweetener producer status and hence will miss 
the opportunity to benefit from exporting sugar to a larger quota allocation (250,000 MT) 
under NAFTA (Figure 1). This is due to growing domestic sugar demand relative to 
sugar production. When Mexico expands sugar production (Scenario 2), there will be still 
no chance for Mexico to attain a net surplus sweetener producer status (Figure 2). Yet, 
Mexico will generate enough surplus sugar to export over-quota (before 2008) and quota-
free (after 2008), resulting in significant impacts on the U.S. market: Mexican sugar will 
take up about one-third (Scenario 1) or more than half (Scenario 2) of the U.S. minimum 
import requirement at peak. The amount of export will decline in later years due to 
expanding domestic sugar consumption in Mexico.    
  In Scenario 3, Mexico adopts HFCS at a high rate. The results include direct 
impacts on the Mexican sweetener market as well as extended impacts on the U.S. 
sweetener market (Figure 3). Although Mexico will not attain a net surplus sweetener 
producer status, over-quota export will reach over 1,200,000 MT and after 2007 quota-
free export continue to remain over 1,000,000 MT for the rest of the forecast horizon.   16
This export quantity will take up almost the entire U.S. minimum import requirement and 
as a result, sugar export from the rest of the world will be marginalized.  
  The U.S. government’s quota allocation poses large impacts on both Mexican 
sugar and sugar from the rest of the world. The aforementioned large-scale export of 
Mexican sugar is possible only if the U.S. imports the minimum amount of sugar and 
allocates sugar quotas in a flexible manner among exporters. This allocation method may 
cause friction with the other sugar exporters since Mexican sugar has potential to take up 
a large portion of the U.S. quota and thus it may not become feasible policy option. In 
Scenario 4, it is conjectured that the U.S. government maintains the minimum quotas (the 
remaining of the minimum import requirement less allocated to Mexico) for the rest of 
the world no matter how much Mexico exports. As shown in Figure 4, Mexico’s over-
quota and quota-free export will be dampened because of Mexico’s comparative 
disadvantage to the rest of the world, while the export from the rest of the world remain 
over 1,200,000 MT over the entire forecast horizon.  
  In spite of the fluctuating import from Mexico and the rest of the world, U.S. 
domestic sugar consumption and production will remain relatively unchanged. The 
results from the simulations showed that the U.S. sugar price will gradually decline but 
will not dip below support price level before 2008 if the United States accepts most of the 
import sugar from Mexico rather than from the rest of the world. This implies that the 
Mexican sugar price contributes to maintain a high sugar price in the integrated the U.S.- 
Mexico sugar market; in other words, accommodating Mexican sugar can act as an 
alternative form of price support in the United states. In reality, the U.S. sugar price will   17
face downward pressure from importing world sugar as well as political pressure from 
the rest of the world. 
  Pay-offs to the industries and countries also portrayed interesting contrasts among 
scenarios. The results from the selected three scenarios (Scenario 1, Scenario 4 and 
Scenario 5) are summarized in Table 4. It is clear that the U.S. HFCS industry will 
become better off if Mexico adopts HFCS: revenue for the U.S. HFCS industry increases 
by 78 percent. Among five entities (three industries and two countries), the U.S. sugar 
industry will be affected the least in a relative sense by the changes in situation or the 
U.S. sugar policy.  
  An extreme result comes from Scenario 4. In this scenario, the U.S. sugar 
program will become extremely costly if the U.S. government reserves the minimum 
quota for the rest of the world. As a result of cheap sugar from the rest of the world 
flowing into the U.S. market, the U.S. demand price will fall far below the support price. 
The sugar industries and welfare in both countries will decline significantly compared to 
the baseline, particularly Mexican sugar industry: it would lose nearly a half of its 
expected revenue. 
  An alternative U.S. sugar policy may bring about some improvement in the U.S. 
welfare (Scenario 5). In addition to the benefit from Mexico’s HFCS adoption, switching 
the price support into buying up the excess sugar turns out beneficial; increased tariff 
revenue from Mexican sugar exceeds the cost of buying up excess sugar. Yet, this 
scenario does not satisfy pareto optimality.  
  If the U.S. government were to switch policies from the price support to buying 
up excess sugar, the timing to do so will be important so as to minimize the cost incurred   18
by the government. The cost of buying up excess sugar will rise immediately after 
policies are switched while the cost of the price support will not because the U.S. sugar 
price will be maintained relatively high in the early stage of the forecast horizon. This 
will be particularly true if the U.S. accepts a large quantity of sugar from Mexico. 
Conclusions 
NAFTA brought about the mixed impacts on the United States and Mexico, and some 
were different from what was expected. The Mexican sugar industry benefited little in the 
past ten years of NAFTA regime and may not expect much in the future either. The 
opportunity for Mexico to export sugar to 250,000 MT of the expanded quota, which is 
roughly 20 percent of the U.S. minimum import requirement, seems unlikely to be 
enjoyed due to Mexico’s tight production compared to its sweetener consumption. Yet, 
Mexico possesses a large potential to export over-quota as well as quota-free which will 
happen when all the restrictions are lifted. The magnitude of over-quota and quota-free 
export depends on the magnitude of Mexico’s sugar production expansion and HFCS 
adoption. Particularly if Mexico adopts HFCS at an increasing rate, a considerable 
amount of surplus sugar will be generated, which poses a direct impact on the Mexican 
sugar industry and an extended impact on the U.S. market as well. As seen in the trade 
dispute over HFCS, Mexico will continue to struggle to suppress HFCS adoption in its 
market.  
  By comparison, NAFTA did not bring about drastic change to the U.S. market: 
expanded exports from Mexico have failed to materialize. Although various simulations 
showed fluctuating sugar export to the United States from Mexico and the rest of the 
world in the future, U.S. domestic sugar production and consumption will remain 
relatively unchanged. What affects the sugar exporters greatly will be the way the U.S.   19
government allocates quotas among exporters. Although the Mexican sugar price 
contributes to maintain a high sugar price in the U.S. market as if acting as an alternative 
form of price support, allocating a large portion of quota to Mexico may not be politically 
feasible. The U.S. government may seek an alternative policy besides the price support 
since the price support may become very costly when combined with the situation where 
the U.S. government promises to accept a large amount of sugar from the rest of the 
world. One scenario showed that the U.S. government may be able to abandon the price 
support and buying up the excess sugar in the market instead, resulting in an 
improvement in welfare brought by increased tariff revenue and a reduced cost. This 
particular scenario may appear plausible; however, the conflicts of interest among 
industries are left unconsidered. Close examinations will be necessary to find a proper 
policy change by taking a decision making process into consideration.    20
Table 1. Details of the Scenarios 
Scenarios Factors  Country  Assumptions 
GDP U.S.  and 
Mexico 
Will increase at the average real GDP annual 
growth rate realized between 1997 and 2001 
(1.0223 for the U.S. and 1.0291 for Mexico) 
Population U.S.  and 
Mexico 
Will increase similarly as the forecast by the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census. (Annual growth rate: 
1.0088 for the U.S. and 1.0115 for Mexico) 
Production cost  U.S. and 
Mexico 
Will decrease at the average annual reduction rate 
realized between 1997 and 2001. (0.989 for the 
U.S. and 0.982 for Mexico) 
Recovery rate  U.S.  Will increase at the average annual improvement 
rate realized between 1997 and 2001. (1.0048) 
Down-time  Mexico  Will decrease at the average annual reduction rate 
realized between 1997 and 2001. (0.990) 
Sugar loss  Mexico  Will decrease at the average annual reduction rate 
realized between 1997 and 2001. (0.980) 
Duration of 
harvest 
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adoption   
(Scenario 3)  
Other shifters  U.S. 
Mexico 
The same as Baseline 
Shifters U.S. 
Mexico 





(Scenario 4)  
Quota 
allocations to 





The U.S. government reserves the minimum 
quotas (the remaining minimum import 
requirement less allocated to Mexico) for the rest 
of the world. 
Shifters U.S. 
Mexico 








U.S.  U.S. government abandons the price support and 
buys up the excess sugar in the market instead. 
Unless mentioned, U.S. price support and flexible quota allocations to the rest of the world are assumed.  21




Supply                Dependent    















132 43  43 43 
Degree of freedom  124  36  36  36 





    




   
Population   -0.6470 
(-0.71) 















   
Dummy variable for 
availability of HFCS  
-0.1853 
(-3.89) ** 
   






Real retail price of 


















Sugar recovery rate    -0.2351 






















2  0.8645 0.8950 0.7253  0.9489 
Durbin-Watson 








* and **: Significant at 90% and 95% confident level, respectively. 
1)  Deflated by CPI. 
2)  Values are after corrected by Yule-Walker method. (  ) corresponds to the order of lag assigned. 
   22
Table 3. Summary of the Mexican Demand and Supply Analysis 
Country Mexico 
Demand Supply                  Dependent    
















30 30 30  13 
Degree of freedom  26  25  25  6 


























Dummy variable for 






Real wholesale price 
of standard sugar in 
the previous year 
1)  
    0.2152 
    (2.52) * 
Real production cost 
per ton of sugar 
1) 
    -0.3228 
   (-7.89) ** 
Down-time            -0.4275 
   (-6.77) ** 
Loss of sugar during 
the process 
          -0.2112 
   (-1.64) 
Duration of the 
harvest 
           1.0010 
    (9.13) ** 
Trend             0.5435 










2  0.9344 0.9729 0.9905  0.7380 
Durbin-Watson 









* and **: Significant at 90% and 95% confident level, respectively. 
1)  Deflated by CPI. 
2)  Values are after corrected by Yule-Walker method. (  ) corresponds to the order of lag assigned. 
























































































Mexico under-quota export Mexico quota-free export
Mexico over-quota export The rest of the world export to the U.S.
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Mexico over-quota export The rest of the world export to the U.S.
 
Figure 2. The U.S. Sugar import Forecast (Scenario 2) 



















































































Mexico under-quota export Mexico quota-free export
Mexico over-quota export The rest of the world export to the U.S.
 

























































































Mexico under-quota export Mexico quota-free export
Mexico over-quota export The rest of the world export to the U.S.
 
Figure 4. The U.S. Sugar import Forecast (Scenario 4)   25
Table 4. Present Value of the Accumulated Pay-offs [billion US$] 
Scenarios Scenario  1  Scenario 4   Scenario 5 
HFCS industry 
revenue  5.684 ( 100 )  10.132 ( 178.3 )  10.132 (  178.3 ) 
Sugar industry 
revenue  35.713 ( 100 )  33.480 ( 93.7 )  35.206 ( 98.6 ) 
Welfare   (a)  354.486 ( 100  )  344.115 ( 97.1  )  354.744 (  100.1 ) 
Tariff revenue 
from Mexican 
sugar   (b) 
0.093 ( 100 )  0.133 ( 142.9 )  0.297 (  320.1 ) 
Cost of price 
support 
program   (c) 
0.208 ( 100 )  6.112 (2,931.5)  0 ( n/a ) 
Cost of buying 
up excess 
sugar   (d) 
0 ( 100 )  0 ( n/a )  0.191 ( n/a ) 
Net cost  




  (a+b-c-d) 
354.370 ( 100 )  338.136 ( 95.4 )  354.850 (  100.1 ) 
Sugar industry 
revenue  21.737 ( 100 )  12.159 ( 55.9 )  21.315 ( 98.1 ) 
Mexico
Welfare 74.443 ( 100  )  69.095 ( 92.8  ) 72.293 (  97.1  ) 
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